I. Introduction
In a seminal article, the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas raised the question of "why we can term secularized societies yet 'post-secular'?" 1 arguing that " […] three overlapping phenomena converge to create the impression of a worldwide ´resurgence of religion`: the missionary expansion, a fundamentalist radicalization, and the political instrumentalization of the potential for violence innate in many of the world religions."
2 Th e point of departure of the present article is to see how main issues and dilemmas that religious minorities and groups pose and face in contemporary societies have been or may be addressed through the lens of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter "the Court" or the "Strasbourg Court").
3 Rather Reformulating some of the issues Habermas identifi ed, the most challenging dilemmas featuring contemporary post-secular societies can be identifi ed as the relationship between state and religion and the tendency toward a 'militant secularism', 6 the missionary expansion and the problem of proselytism, the general distrust toward new religious movements, especially in a context in which one or more religions are mainstream, the issue of off enses to the religious feeling of believers, and the accommodation of increasing religious diversity in everyday life.
II. Definitional questions
Th e international catalogue of human rights contains many treaties and provisions concerning freedom of religion and beliefs.
8 Regarding Europe, the fi rst can be consulted in the offi cial website of the Court at <http://www.echr.coe.int/ echr/en/hudoc/description/>. 4
Human rights law has so far avoided a defi nition of religion, except to ensure that it includes the concept of belief. As John Witte Jr. has noted: "Th is capacious defi nition of religion in international law has left it largely to individual states and individual claimants to defi ne the boundaries of the regime of religious rights". Unfortunately, continues the same author, individual legislatures "embrace a bewildering array of defi nitions of religion". John Witte Jr., "Introduction", in John Witte Jr. and Johan D. van der Vyver (eds.), Religious Human Rights in a Global Perspective: Religious Perspectives (Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, Th e Hague, 1996). 5
Th e concept of belief includes religion but is not limited to its traditional meaning. Belief is thus a broader concept than religion and has been defi ned legally as "a conviction of the truth of a proposition, existing subjectively in the mind, and induced by argument, persuasion, or proof addressed to the judgment". See, Natan Lerner, Religion, Secular Beliefs and Human Rights: 25 
